With imperfect markets for the services of the higher education sector, it is important to assess the effectiveness of institutions. Previous studies have analysed the costs of universities but only one, to our knowledge, their efficiency. In this paper, we examine the costs and efficiency of institutions of higher education as suppliers of teaching and research using the method of stochastic frontier analysis. This paper is unique in that it investigates the impact of staff and student characteristics on efficiency. We find that there is inefficiency in higher education. This result is robust to the inclusion of a qualitative measure of output into the cost function. There is also evidence of convergence in the inefficiency of institutions, implying that the less efficient institutions are 'catching up' with those nearer to the cost frontier. Our analysis suggests that the anticipation of the introduction of tuition fees may have led to a shake-up in the less efficient universities. However, the results suggest that this effect was short-lived and offset by the more efficient universities relaxing somewhat.
Introduction
There have been many investigations of university costs and their implications for the scale and scope of the provision of the various aspects of higher education institutions (e.g., Cohn, Rhine and Santos, 1989; DeGroot, McMahon and Volkwein, 1991; Glass, McKillop and Hyndman, 1995; Hashimoto and Cohn, 1997; Nelson and Hevert, 1992; Johnes, 1997; Izadi and Johnes, 1997; Koshal and Koshal, 1999; and Koshal, Koshal and Gupta 2000) . All of these studies save one, however, assume economic efficiency, i.e. that the university produces on the minimum-cost frontier. This study is unique in that it employs a method that allows us to not only account for inefficiency in university provision, but also investigate the influences on inefficiency.
There are many problems associated with the analysis of higher education institutions (HEIs) as producers. Rating their output is difficult without reference to a set of policy preferences. Is the primary purpose of the higher education sector merely to produce as many graduates as possible, or is it to safeguard the value of certification for the select few that undertake it? HEIs and society as a whole may have a number of objectives regarding the quality and quantity of both teaching and research. This problem has become more acute because of the blurring of the lines between the old polytechnics, with their emphasis on teaching and the vocational aspects in particular, and the 'old' universities with their accent on the more generalist and academic aspects.
Tied up with this policy question is the analytical problem of how best to consider such institutions. The output of a HEI is generally considered to be the teaching and research it undertakes. However, the majority of the empirical work in this area before the 1980s ignored the research aspect of HEIs' activities. The view of a university as a producer in recent years has been overhauled in light of the pioneering work of Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) in industrial economics. HEIs are now considered as producers of multiple outputs.
In this study we employ the method of stochastic frontier analysis to estimate the cost relationship in higher education allowing for multiple outputs to be produced by HEIs and for inefficiency in production. This study is unique in that it employs a method that allows us to not only account for inefficiency in university provision, but also investigate the influences on inefficiency.
The University as Producer
Few would disagree with the assertion of Hare and Wyatt (1992) that 'The principal output of the higher education system is knowledge ... produced by ... research and teaching ' (p. 48) . However, it is difficult to be more specific when defining the precise raison d'être of a 'typical' higher education institution, or indeed whether such a typical institution exists. The higher education sector is now made up of new and old universities that were once polytechnics and universities with different functions, but are now legally identical entities. Any model of university production must be able to account for the fact that universities attach different levels of importance to the various aspects of higher education.
Early empirical work in this area concentrated on the cost per student of HEIs and the nature the economies of scale that might exist 1 . However, an important factor to consider when investigating the performance of HEIs is their 'multi-dimensional nature' 2 . Over the last decade or so, work has recognised the multi-product nature of HEIs by including a measure of research output (typically research funding attracted) and graduate instruction (e.g. Cohn, Rhine and Santos, 1989; Hyndman, 1995: Hashimoto and Cohn, 1997; Koshal and Koshal, 1999) . Other studies have tried to account for the fact that the production of science and arts graduates both have very different cost implications. This is done by including a dummy variable for lab-based subjects (Nelson and Hevert, 1992) or including numbers of both separately (Johnes, 1997; Izadi and Johnes, 1997) . All of the studies so far mentioned have followed the path of estimating a cost function, although the functional forms adopted have differed. Cohn Rhine and Santos (1989) and Koshal and Koshal (1999) employed a flexible fixed cost quadratic cost function, DeGroot, McMahon and Volkwein (1991) and Nelson and Hevert (1992) a translog and Johnes (1997) and Izadi and Johnes (1997) a constant elasticity of substitution cost function. However, with the exception of Izadi and Johnes (1997) , all of these studies have assumed there to be technical and allocative efficiency 3 . This is rather a strong assumption if, as Bowen (1991) postulated, universities merely spend what they get with no emphasis on cost minimisation, as they do not have to maximise profits or surplus. Moreover, in the absence of qualitative measures of inputs and outputs, such work is likely to give a seriously misleading picture of the effectiveness of the HE sector.
1 For a review of this literature from a US perspective see Brinkman and Leslie (1986) . 2 Cohn, Rhine and Santos (1989); p. 284. 3 See Section 3 below for a definition of technical and allocative efficiency.
Another factor of which none of the previous studies mentioned above has taken into account is the quality of HEIs' output. Whilst it is difficult, if not impossible, to account fully for any such variation, one can account for differences in degree classification. In the presence of external examiners, visits by assessors such as the quality assurance agency (QAA) and the pressure of the maintenance of reputation, we believe that the proportion of firsts and upper seconds represents a relatively consistent measure of degree quality, and certainly the best that is readily available.
Previous studies have rarely taken into account the quality of the students enrolling at the HEI. An exception to this is Koshal and Koshal (1999) who included the average Student Aptitude Test scores of students. For the UK, work such as Bee and Dolton (1985) , Dolton (1986) and Johnes and Taylor (1987) have found a strong positive relationship between degree results and A-level scores. Therefore, a failure to account for input quality would provide an imprecise measure of university teaching output. The value of higher education to both the student and society as a whole is the 'value added' by the university (Johnes, 1992; Cave and Weale, 1992) . In this study we use the average A-Level/Highers score of students on entering the university as a measure of the quality of students as an input.
Stochastic Frontier Analysis
Stochastic frontier models date back to Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meesen and van den Broek (1977) , who independently proposed a stochastic frontier production function with a two-part 'composed' error term. In the production context, where its use is most common 4 , this error is composed of a standard random error term, representing measurement error and other random factors, and a one-sided random variable representing what Farrell (1957) called 'technical inefficiency', i.e. the distance of the observation from the production frontier. This notion of technical efficiency reflects the ability of a firm, country or university to obtain maximal output from a given set of inputs. It is measured by the output of the firm relative to that which it could attain if it were 100 % efficient, i.e. if it lay on the frontier itself, and is therefore bound between zero and one. When one combines this with allocative efficiency, the ability of the firm etc to use the inputs in optimal proportions, given their respective prices, one has a measure of total economic efficiency.
Using duality in production, one can consider cost efficiency
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. This is particularly useful in the context of higher education institutions as it allows for the unit of observation to produce more than one product (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982) . A typical stochastic cost frontier would be ( )
where costs for firm i, C i , depend upon a vector of variables, X, and parameters, β β β β, a non-negative random variable, η, and a random error term, ε. It is this η term that represents inefficiency. Note that the inefficiency effect is added in the cost frontier, rather than subtracted, as is the case for the SFA production frontier. This is because the cost function represents minimum cost, whereas the production function represents maximum output. Also unlike the production frontier SFA approach, this inefficiency represents total economic inefficiency, i.e. technical inefficiency (not getting enough output from the inputs) plus allocative inefficiency (not using the inputs or producing 4 See Lovell and Schmidt (1993) and Coelli, Rao and Battese (1999) for examples. 5 E.g. Kumbhakar, Gosh and McGulkin (1991) and Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) the outputs in the correct proportions) 6 . Such a cost frontier is estimated for the UK HE sector by Izadi and Johnes (1997) , who assume that c(•) takes a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form.
The question that immediately arises from a casual inspection of (1) is 'what determines η?' Technical and allocative inefficiency can be caused by all sorts of productive and organisational inefficiency, from ineffective management to problems with inputs. Are certain types of HEIs more likely to be inefficient than others are?
Does it depend upon the personal characteristics of the staff employed by an institution?
or does a student body with particular characteristics make the efficient provision of HE more difficult? In the production context, work such as Pitt and Lee (1981) and Kalirajan (1981) investigated the determinants of technical efficiency of firms by performing a second stage regression of the predicted ηs on firm specific factors.
However, as Kumbhakar, Gosh and McGulkin (1991) and Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) have noted, there is a significant problem with this approach. In the first stage, the η terms are assumed to be independently and identically distributed, but in the second stage they are assumed to be a function of these firm-specific factors, implying that they are not identically distributed, unless all the coefficients of the factors are simultaneously equal to zero 7 . Kumbhakar, Gosh and McGulkin (1991), Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) and Huang and Liu (1994) presented models to overcome this problem by estimating the both the frontier and efficiency terms in one stage. These models were extended by Battese and Coelli (1995) to allow for panel data estimation.
It is the Battese and Coelli (1995) method that we employ in this study. 6 In the production function model, one requires relative input prices to determine whether production is optimal 7 For more on this subject see Coelli, Rao and Battese (1999) , chapter 8.
Empirical Model
In order to investigate empirically cost inefficiency in UK HEIs, we employ a multidimensional cost function model. The general form of the cost function is
where C it is the total cost of university i at time t, Q is a vector of output quantities (undergraduate teaching in the arts and in the sciences, postgraduate teaching and research), W a vector of input prices 8 , Z are other factors that influence costs directly and it η represents inefficiency, which we discuss in greater detail below.
The outputs considered in this study are the numbers of arts and science undergraduates (AUG and SUG, respectively) 9 , the number of post-graduate students (PG) and the total research funding attracted (RES). The use of what is apparently an input to measure an output may at first appear strange. Johnes (1997) argues that 'research grants are in general awarded to meritorious groups of researchers on the basis of the quality and quantity of their previous work (and … the weights assigned to quantity and quality in this measure are precisely those assigned by the 'market' for research) ' (p. 728) . Moreover, Koshal and Koshal (1999) argue that there is be a high correlation between research output and grant support.' They find a correlation of 0.7 between this and faculty publications (based on data compiled from the National Academy of Sciences), for the institutions in the US where the latter data is available.
8 Although we only have one input price in this case, average staff costs. 9 The science subjects are defined as those falling into the following categories: clinical medicine an dentistry, veterinary science, anatomy and physiology, nursing and paramedical studies, health and community studies, psychology and behavioural sciences, pharmacy, pharmacology, biosciences, chemistry, physics, agriculture and forestry, earth, marine and environmental sciences, general sciences, general engineering, chemical engineering, mineral, metallurgy and materials engineering, civil engineering, electrical, electronic and computer engineering, mechanical, aero-and production engineering, other technologies, architecture, built environment and planning, mathematics, information technology and systems sciences, sports science, and computer software engineering.
There is a correlation of 0.65 between the research funding a university attracts and the average score across all departments in the 1996 Research Assessment Exercise. The RAE is entirely retrospective and, moreover, also does not vary over the time-scale of this study. The research finding attracted is likely to be more representative of current research output as it is paying for current research. It does in part depend upon the outcome of the RAE, but also depends on more recent output
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. It also reflects research outside of traditional publications and so reflects universities' more general research role.
We also consider the effect of the quality of student intake, as measured by the average A-Level/Highers score. The effect of the average A-Level/Highers score of a university's intake on its cost could be either positive or negative. Students with high Alevels may be cheaper to teach because of their higher ability (although this could go the other way because of their more voracious intellectual appetite). On the other hand, it may cost universities money to attract brighter students. Operating in this way, the average A-level score is acting as an indicator of factor price. Koshal and Koshal (1999) found a positive correlation between costs and SAT scores at private universities in the US, although they found no significant effect in public institutions. This is consistent with the view that only the private universities have the financial means with which to bid for the higher quality students 11 .
The main difference between our model and the majority of the literature is the inclusion of the efficiency effect it η . The only other model to include an effect of this 10 E.g. the success of attracting this year's grants will depend upon the success of work done under last year's ones. 11 The only potentially similar split that the UK has is between the 'old' and 'new' (i.e. former polytechnic) universities. However, we found no evidence that costs or efficiency are significantly different between these two types of institution, or that they were differently trended. In what follows, therefore, they are considered as a whole.
nature is, to our knowledge, Izadi and Johnes (1997) . Izadi and Johnes (1997) look only at one time period and, moreover, do not attempt to investigate the determinants of this inefficiency. They find that inefficiency exists, but discus only the implications for economies of scale in any depth.
Our empirical model is a translog cost function of the form (3) where Q j is the output of the j-th product (see below for a more precise description of the four outputs). We only have one cost -that of staff -available to us. Therefore, W it , represents average staff costs (total staff costs divided by staff FTE 12 ) deflated using the sector average in 1995/6. We describe the other direct influences on cost and the determinants of the efficiency effects η it below. The ε it terms are random errors, assumed to be i.i.d. and have ( )
Because (3) is not defined for zero outputs, many studies have used flexible fixed cost quadratic form for (2) (e.g. Cohn, Rhine and Santos, 1989; Hashimoto and Cohn, 1997; and Koshal and Koshal, 1999) . This is because multiple output concepts such as average incremental costs require the calculation of costs when one of the outputs is set to zero (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982) . Since the subject of this study is of the determinants of inefficiency (as defined as HEIs producing away from the cost frontier)
rather than issues such as economies of scale and scope, we do not face this problem 12 See below for a more thorough description of this and the other variables.
and can use the translog specification 13 . The translog function has the advantage over the other forms discussed in section 2 that it incorporates constant returns to scale and approximates more sophisticated functional forms, such as the CES.
Following Battese and Coelli (1995) , the inefficiency effect is obtained by a truncation of the ( )
where E it is a (M×1) vector of observable explanatory variables representing the characteristics of the student and staff bodies (discussed below), and δ is a (1×M) vector of unknown scalar parameters to be estimated (which includes an intercept parameter).
The staff characteristics considered are the proportion of staff that are aged over fifty years of age, the proportion of staff who are female, the proportion of staff who belong to non-white ethnic groups, the proportion of the teaching staff who are The proportions are based on staff full time equivalents (FTE) rather than absolute numbers. Student characteristics beyond A-level points include the proportion of mature students (i.e. those over twenty five years of age on starting their course), the proportion of students who are female, the proportion of students from non-white ethnic groups, the proportion of students from lower social classes (i.e. SOC major groups 8 and 9, and 13 NB. None of the universities in our sample produce zero of any of the outputs. 14 As suggested by Earl (2001) , who divides staff grades into five groupings: 'professors'; 'senior lecturers and researchers'; 'lecturers'; 'researchers'; and 'other grades'. The professor group includes: 'heads of departments (PCEF scale)'; 'professors (UAP minimum)'; 'research grade IV (UAP scale)'; 'clinical professors'; 'professors/heads of department (CSCFC scale)'; and 'professors in locally determined scales'. 15 Again, defined according to the typology of Earl (2001) . Even if the university could control the amount of particular types of student i.e. the number of students it attracts from ethnic minorities or other groups such as mature students, there is a question mark over whether they should do so. Such selection choices are often implicit rather than explicit, being the indirect result of other criteria, such as entry requirements.
The log-likelihood function for this model is presented in Battese and Coelli (1993) , as are the first partial derivatives of the log-likelihood function with respect to the different parameters of the model 19 .
The maximum likelihood estimators for the parameters in the model were obtained using the FRONTIER computer program (Coelli, 1996) .
One of the parameters estimated is 
This γ-parameter lies between zero and one 17 See footnote † to Table 1 . 18 C.f. Worthington (1999), Stevens and Vecchi (2001) . 19 This parameterisation originates in Battese and Corra (1977) .
The generalised likelihood-ratio test for the null hypothesis that the γ parameter and the δ parameters are jointly equal to zero is calculated by using the values of the log-likelihood function for estimating the full frontier model and that obtained by using OLS regression to estimate the parameters of the cost function only. This statistic has a mixed chi-square distribution, as indeed will any generalised likelihood-ratio statistic associated with the null hypothesis involving the γ parameter The terms included in the vector E it in this study include the arts/science mix of the university (the proportion of students studying arts-based subjects), a time trend, and a set of staff and student characteristics. These are outlined in more detail below. Here we note that it is only the staff details, the arts/science mix and the proportion of students attaining first and upper second class degrees that have a time dimension. The other student details represent values from the cohorts in the 1997/8 student-body. 20 See Coelli and Battese (1996) .
Data
The data for the analysis come, directly and indirectly, from data collected by the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) on behalf of the UK funding councils. The HESA data come from the Finance Record (1995/6 to 1998/9), the Individualised Staff
Record (1995/6 to 1998/9) and the Individualised Student Record (1997/8). We also use annual data on entry requirements (Average A-Level/Highers points) and the percentage of students who achieve firsts and upper seconds published by the Times Higher Education Supplement. We confine our analysis to institutions of higher education in England and Wales, to avoid any problems caused by the differences in the system in Scotland. It is also argued that the universities in Northern Ireland also should be considered as separate entities from those on the mainland. This choice and various others of data availability give us a balanced panel of eighty institutions over four years.
Definitions of the variables and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 . 
Results
The results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the stochastic frontier quadratic cost function for the academic-years 1995/6 to 1998/9 are presented in Table 2 and   Table 3 . We consider three specifications. In model 1 we consider the simplest case, which includes a variable for student quality only (ALEV), as do Koshal and Koshal (1999) . Model 2 is a more sophisticated version of model 1 that accounts for the interactions between student quality and the other variables in a manner more in keeping with the general translog cost function approach. Model 3 also includes our undergraduate teaching output quality measure (FIRST).
The implications of our cost function for economies of scale and scope in university production are not the main thrust of this study and so we do not, therefore, consider them in any depth. Briefly, the results presented in Table 2 correspond to those of work such as deGroot, McMahon and Volkwein (1991) or Nelson and Hevert (1992) , with the exception of the time trend, which shows a very slight increase in inefficiency ceteris paribus. Our first model is a similar those used in the previous work, discussed above. Like Koshal and Koshal (1999) we find a positive (although not very significant)
effect of student quality on costs. This may reflect the higher cost of attracting the better-qualified students. It may however be the product of misspecification, as we discuss below. The results with regard the interaction between the two broad roles of a higher education institution, teaching and research, are mixed. The coefficients on the interaction terms between science undergraduates and research (SUGRES) and arts undergraduates and research (AUGRES) imply diseconomies of scope between undergraduate teaching and undertaking research, suggesting benefits from separating these. Conversely, the positive sign on the interaction term between post-graduate teaching and research, implying the opposite. This result is not surprising since graduate instruction is much more closely related to research and one can see the potential for economies of scope from the viewpoint of academic staff more clearly. Moreover, many students reading for taught post-graduate courses are preparing for research and those reading for degrees by research are actually undertaking research themselves. Certainly, Cohn, Rhine and Santos (1989) also find a statistically significant negative relationship between undergraduate enrolment and research in public universities and a positive relationship between postgraduate enrolment and research in both public and private US universities. The results of Koshal and Koshal (1999) , also in the US, concur less well.
They find a significant positive interaction between undergraduate teaching and research in private universities but no interaction between either type of teaching and research in public universities. Turning to the efficiency effects presented in Table 3 , which are the main focus of this study, most of the (δ) terms are statistically significant in all of the models. Those of models 1 and 2 are generally of similar size and significance. The efficiency scores themselves are presented in the appendix to this paper (Table 7 to Table 9 ). Summary statistics and correlations are presented in Table 4 , below. The efficiency score shows an institution's costs relative to the frontier, i.e. a score of one indicates that it is fully efficient and scores above one indicate actual costs are a multiple of efficient costs. As have noted above, the γ-parameter gives an impression of the influence of the efficiency terms as the γ value shows the contribution of the η efficiency term to the whole of the dichotomous error term (ε + η). The estimate of γ for model 1 is 0.636.
That is, η contributes 63.6% of the total variance of the error term. The estimates of γ for models 2 and 3 are 0.663 and 0.812, respectively. The generalised likelihood ratio test of γ = 0 indicates that this effect is significantly different from zero. Therefore, the 'average response' cost function is not an adequate representation of the data. This result mirrors Izadi and Johnes' (1997) findings using the simple stochastic frontier model and suggests that previous estimates of economies of scale and scope may be biased.
The time trend has a significant negative coefficient in all specifications, implying that universities have shifted down toward the cost frontier and have, therefore, become more efficient over the period. Looking at models 1 and 2 together, the proportion of staff who are over fifty, non-white, or female have a negative effect on efficiency, ceteris paribus, whereas the proportion who are of professorial or senior lecturer grade or who are research active has a positive one. (NB a positive coefficient represents a positive effect on inefficiency, i.e. causes the university to be further above the minimum cost frontier). The fact that staff who are of a higher ability (i.e. those that reach the grade of professor or senior lecturer) are more efficient should not be a great surprise. Note that this is above and beyond the direct cost they incur in terms of higher wages, which operates through the cost function itself. Given that wage profiles of staff are determined by grade and age, the negative coefficients on the proportions of professors and senior lecturers and the positive one on staff over 51 could be related.
Since promotions in grade are likely to be related to both innate ability and experience, those members of staff who are over 51 but are not senior lecturers or professors may well be less efficient than those who are. The negative effect of female and non-white academic staff on efficiency is more difficult to explain, although the latter effect becomes even less significant in model 2 (and becomes negative in model 3). The higher inefficiency of staff with a large number of female staff could be a human capital effect caused by absence from the labour market due to career breaks for example.
However, studies have consistently found that women earn less than men for a given set of characteristics and so one might expect the effect to work in the opposite direction, since women's wages reflect their productivity less than that of men. The proportion of students who are mature or from the lower social classes 21 is positively correlated with efficiency whereas HEIs with large numbers of arts students are generally more efficient. Model 2 indicates that institutions with larger proportions of female students also tend to be more efficient. However this effect is not significant in model 1.
The proportion of students achieving first and upper second class degrees is positively correlated with efficiency. However, it could be argued that the proportion of students achieving first and upper second should be considered an output in and of itself. That is, that the decision to go for quality rather than just quantity has more complex ramifications than merely the effect on efficiency. Therefore, in our third specification we include quadratic and interaction terms for the proportion of students achieving firsts. With these terms included, we can account for the cost implications of the decision between quantity and quality of teaching.
The results of this estimation are shown in the last columns of Table 2 and Table   3 . Again, there is a slight upward trend in costs and efficiency over the period. Looking at the results for the cost function in Table 2 , as one would expect, it costs money to produce better quality degrees ceteris paribus. There is no evidence of a trade off between quality and quantity in science subjects, although there do appear to be economies of scope in the arts. There does appear to be a negative interaction between the quality of undergraduate teaching and research, a trade-off that academics who have had students knocking on their door outside office hours can understand. There is a significant interaction between the quality of the undergraduate teaching and the costs of post-graduate teaching and supervision. 21 See fn. † to Table 1 above for a definition of the STUC8 variable.
The effect of this change in specification on the significance and sign of the efficiency terms is relatively minor. The exception to this is, as one might expect, the effect of the proportion of students achieving firsts and upper seconds. This remains significant, but changes sign from negative to positive. That is, universities that produce a large number of high-achieving students tend to be less efficient, when one accounts for the direct effect of teaching quality on costs. The γ-parameter for model 3 increases from around 0.6 to 0.812, indicating that an even greater proportion of the error variance is accounted for by η(E).
It is interesting to note the correlation across years. The Pearson correlation statistics presented in Table 5 show that scores are highly correlated over the years and the Spearman rank correlations suggest that there is little movement in rankings between years.
Table 5 Correlations
Pearson Spearman (Rank) Model 1 1995 Model 1 /6 1996 Model 1 /7 1997 Model 1 /8 1998 Model 1 /9 1995 Model 1 /6 1996 Model 1 /7 1997 Model 1 /8 1998 Model 1 /9 1995 . The former case refers to a tendency for low income countries (inefficient HEIs in our case) to grow (decrease their costs) faster than more efficient ones. This is often referred to as 'regression toward the mean'. The second type of convergence, σ convergence, refers to a tendency for dispersion of inefficiency scores to decline over time. β convergence tends to generate σ convergence, but this process can be offset by new disturbances that tend to increase dispersion. We apply the same approach to our HEI inefficiency measures, looking to see first whether there is regression to the mean and secondly whether inefficiency scores have become less dispersed over time.
In Table 6 we present the results of regressing the change in inefficiency
, on the institution's initial score (i.e. for 1995/6) and a constant.
For all three models, we find that the change in inefficiency does indeed depend negatively on initial inefficiency. That is, the greater the inefficiency in a HEI in 1995/6, the more inefficiency is expected to fall. The process is slow, with only 6% of the gap between the actual values and the mean being closed on average in any year.
However, closer examination of Table 6 shows that this average reflects a fairly large adjustment in 1997/8 and little movement in other years, indeed the third model implies a small increase in the year after. 1997/8 was the last academic year before tuition fees were introduced and university provision may have been effected by the anticipation of a one-off surge of students deciding against deferring their studies (the so-called 'gap year') to avoid paying fees. The belief on which this anticipation is based -one that was certainly prevalent at the time -is not consistent with the data however. The increase in overall student numbers in England and Wales was relatively unaffected by the introduction of fees. Student numbers increased by about 2.6% between 1996/7 and 1997/8 and more than 3% between 1997/8 and 1998/9. One could argue that this increase in student numbers was largely unforeseen by the education authorities since there was no rise in the numbers of student places funded or staff numbers
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. However, it is perhaps better to see this in the broader context of the government's attempts to keep public spending down. There is also some evidence of σ convergence. As we can see from Table 4 , there is a decline in the standard deviation of the inefficiency scores for the first two models model over the entire period and for the second model except for a small increase in academic year 1996/7. This supports the view that there has been convergence in the cost efficiency in English and Welsh HEIs. Moreover, any new disturbances to this process do not appear to have swamped the overall convergence. However, it should be borne in mind that these results are not very strong and only refer to a short time period.
One of the motivations of this study was to assess the effect of the introduction of tuition fees on university production. The results for β convergence might suggest that the anticipation of the introduction of tuition fees led to a 'shake-up' of the less efficient universities and prompting them to become more efficient. However, the σ convergence results suggest that fees did not have a large overall effect compared to other trends.
The anticipatory improvement of the poor institutions also appears to have been offset by others slipping.
Conclusions
We have examined the costs of higher education and found that there is inefficiency in production. Moreover, the inefficiency in higher education institutions can be modelled as a function of their student and staff bodies. This result is robust to the inclusion of a qualitative measure of output into the cost function. Our results suggest that a significant portion of the error term in the cost function is explained by the inefficiency effect. Therefore, any study that seeks to assess the costs of production (i.e. issues such as economies of scale and scope) are liable to produce biased results.
Although costs have generally risen, output has more so and efficiency does appear to have increased over the period 1995/6 to 1998/9. We have observed a number of influences on efficiency. The proportions of staff who are non-white, of professorial or senior lecturer grade or are research active have a positive effect on efficiency, ceteris paribus, whereas the proportion that is over-fifty has a negative one. The proportion of students achieving first and upper second class degrees is negatively correlated with efficiency, once one accounts for its direct impact on costs, as is the proportion of students who are female. Conversely, HEIs with large numbers of students who are mature (over twenty-five years of age when starting their course) or from lower social classes are generally more efficient, as are those with larger
proportions of female and non-white students.
Finally, the results for our analysis of convergence issues suggest that the anticipation of the introduction of tuition fees may have lead to a shake-up in the less efficient universities. However, the results suggest that this effect was short-lived and offset by the more efficient universities relaxing somewhat. 
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